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MEDIA LAWS IN LATIN AMERICA:
A COMPARISON BETWEEN VENEZUELA
AND ARGENTINA
Julieta Grinffiel*
I. INTRODUCTIONFREEDOM of expression is an inalienable right and one of the pil-
lars of a democratic society.' Since the days of de Tocqueville and
Locke, media has been regarded as crucial in the prevention of au-
thoritarianism and the loss of individual liberties. 2 As integral as free-
dom of the press is to American society,3 many nations around the world
still practice forms of prior censorship on media outlets and individual
opinions alike.4 In fact, earlier this year, the Egyptian government or-
dered the shutdown of the five internet service providers in Egypt while a
nation-wide anti-government protest was taking place.5 Reiterating
American ideals, President Obama urged Egyptian authorities to refrain
from any violence and stated, "[t]he people of Egypt have [a] . . . right to
peaceful assembly and association, the right to free speech, and the ability
to determine their own destiny. These are human rights. And the United
States will stand up for them everywhere." 6 Latin American countries,
due to their histories and cultures, have been criticized for being more
restrictive than countries like the United States and the United King-
dom. 7 Recently, Venezuela and Argentina experienced changes in their
*B.A. Southern Methodist University, 2007; J.D. Candidate SMU Dedman School
of Law, 2012. Editor-in-Chief, LAw & BUSINEss RiEVH-W OF rH AMERICAs, 2011-
2012. 1 would like to thank the International Law Review Association editorial
board and staff as well as my loving and supportive family.
1. See generally, Monroe E. Price & Peter Krug, The Enabling Env't. for Free &
Indep. Media, in MEDIA MArfERs 95, 95 (Mark Harvey ed., 2006), available at
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article= 11 44&context=ascpapers.
2. Id. at 96.
3. Id.
4. Media Law Reform in New Democracies, DEMOCRACY DIALOGUE (USAID's
Global Ctr. for Democracy & Governance, Washington, D.C.), July 1998, at 1,
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usaid/ddmedia-final.pdf.
5. Christopher Rhoades & Geofrey A. Fowler, Egypt Shuts Down Internet, Cell
Phone Services, WAu Sr. J., Jan. 29, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142
4052748703956604576110453371369740.html?mod=googlenews-wsj.
6. President Barack Obama, Remarks on Egypt in the State Dining Room of the
White House (Jan. 28, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.time.com/time/
world/article/0,8599,2045085,00.html?xid=rss-mostpopular).
7. See generally id.; Roy Carroll, South America: Media Has Become a Political Bat-
tleground, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 4, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/
jan/04/south-america-media-political-battleground.
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media laws.8 This article will compare each law in light of each country's
respective history. Part II will focus on Venezuela, first by discussing the
country's history, then by outlining the provisions in the Social Responsi-
bility on Radio and Television Act of 2004, newly amended to include the
Internet as a regulated medium. Part III will focus on Argentina's history
and the provisions of the Audiovisual Communications Services Law of
2009. It will also highlight a lawsuit that has been brought against the
Argentine government to challenge the act. Part IV will discuss the
Hutchins Commission of the 1940s and by applying the five requirements
that constitute a free media, will come to the determination that the Ar-
gentine law fosters democratic ideals and the promotion of human rights
better than the Venezuelan law. Finally, Part V will consider changes that
Venezuela should implement in its media law to incorporate the universal
right to freedom of speech and ways that the international community
can pressure President Hugo Chavez and the National Assembly in an
attempt to further democracy.
II. VENEZUELA
A. HUGO CHAVEZ'S RISE TO POWER
In the 1970s, Venezuela was known to its citizens as "Venezuela
Saudita" as they believed that they would soon live in a rich and highly
industrialized nation due to revenues from their oil.9 But by the begin-
ning of the 1980s, it was clear that Venezuela's economy was starting to
deteriorate due to the Venezuelan government's foreign debt and the
sudden decrease of oil prices.' 0 It was during this time that Chavez cre-
ated the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario (MBR) within the Ven-
ezuelan army."1 Although it initially began as a "political study circle"12
rather than the eventual coup d'etat that it manifested into, MBR saw its
current government as anything but a democracy and began recruiting
discontented members of the army into its movement.13 During the
1980s, the members of MBR climbed up the army ranks and waited for
the perfect time to stage their coup d'etat on President Carlos Andres
Perez and it was the event known as the Carazco that fueled their revolu-
8. See generally Ley de Servicio de Comunicaci6n Audiovisual [Audiovisual Commu-
nication Services Law], Law No. 26.522, Aug. 31, 2010, [31756] B.O. 1 (Arg.), avail-
able at http://www.coalicion.org.ar/ley26522.pdf [hereinafter Audiovisual Law];
Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio, Televisi6n, y Medios Electronicos [Social
Responsibility on Radio & Television Act], art. 1, Dec. 21, 2010 (Venez.), available
at http://www.scribd.com/doc/45291089/Proyecto-de-Ley-de-Responsabilidad-en-
Radio-Television-y-Medios-Electronicos [hereinafter RESORTE].
9. RICHTARD Gorr, HUGO CHAVEZ AND TiHE B0LIVARIAN REVOLUTION 37-38
(2005).
10. Angel Luis Olivera Soto, Prior Restraints in Venezuela's Social Responsibility on
Radio and Television Act: Are they Justified?, 40 Gieo. WASI. INT'l L. REv. 401,
403 (2008).
11. Gonr, supra note 9, at 38.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 38-39.
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tionary fervor.14
The Carazco began on the morning of February 27, 1989.15 Due to the
country's overwhelming debt, President Perez implemented a few eco-
nomic policies that caused the price of petroleum to increase by 100%
and subsequently increase the price of gasoline.16 The frustration of the
citizenry was clear as thousands of workers protested this increase on the
streets of Caracas that morning and every day for over six days, resulting
in riots and a state of emergency for the country.' 7 In addition to impos-
ing a nationwide curfew on the citizens, the Perez regime further "im-
pos[ed] . . . martial law and suspen[ded] . . . all civil liberties."' 8 The
Carazco started as a protest that culminated in the popular disapproval of
the government and the country's recession.' 9 Soon after the Carazco
began, President Perez suffered another shot to his popularity when he
implemented the economic policy of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), a policy he had long opposed. 20 Hugo Chavez used this opportu-
nity to overthrow the government, but inevitably failed and was incarcer-
ated for his attempt.21
It was not until 1998 that Hugo Chavez finally rose to power.22 The
Venezuelan citizenry, hungry for a new leader and enthused by Chavez's
charisma and rhetoric about nationalism and the improvement of the
Venezuelan condition,23 brought the president into power with fifty-six
percent of the vote.2 4 Four years later, President Chavez was nearly
ousted and overthrown by an attempted coup d'etat staged by the me-
dia.2 5 Private media outlets, frustrated by the Chavez administration's
changes to the executive board of Petroleros de Venezuela (PDVSA), 26
encouraged the opposition to march the streets and demand the resigna-
tion of President Chavez.27 In an attempt to thwart the oncoming coup,
the Chavez administration applied Article 192 of the Organic Telecom-
munications Act.2 8 This article states that the government can order the
media, both private and public, to transmit its messages for free whenever
14. Soto, supra note 10, at 404-05.
15. Gorr, supra note 9, at 43.
16. Soto, supra note 10, at 404.
17. Id. at 404-05.
18. Gorr, supra note 9, at 45.
19. Soto, supra note 10, at 404.
20. Goirr, supra note 9, at 49, 54 (stating an outline of this policy).
21. Soto, supra note 10, at 405.
22. Id. at 406.
23. Id. at 405-06.
24. Will Grant, Chavez Still Standing 10 Years On, BBC Niws (U.K.), Dec. 6, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7767417.stm.
25. See generally Go-rr, supra note 9, at 223-38.
26. Eva Golinger, A Case Study of Media Concentration and Power in Venezuela,
VENEZUELANALYSIS.COM, Sept. 25, 2004, at 8, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analy-
sis/710.
27. Id. at 8-9.
28. Id. at 9.
5592011]
560 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 17
required without the obligations of a public media channel.29 The media
bypassed this measure by cutting their screen shots into two and playing
President Chavez's messages alongside their scheduled programming.30
Because the media had opposed President Chavez since his entrance into
the political arena, the reports coming out of the country were one-sided
and failed to tell the world that in actuality the president had not resigned
and had instead been kidnapped by the opposition.31 Eventually, the
coup failed as Chavez supporters flooded the streets and demanded the
release of President Chavez.32 Because of the damage that the media
caused in the 2002 coup d'etat, it is no surprise that President Chavez
signed the Social Responsibility on Radio and Television Act
(RESORTE) into law in 2004.33
B. THE VENEZUELAN CONSTITUTION, AMERICAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Upon being sworn into office, President Chavez's first major action was
to re-write the Venezuelan Constitution to "include a more diverse spec-
trum of social, economic, cultural, political and civil rights, and to inte-
grate the armed forces into the economic and social life of the country
through a program titled 'Plan Bolivar 2000.' "34 Article 57 of the Vene-
zuelan Constitution addresses freedom of expression, stating, "[e]veryone
has the right to express freely his or her thoughts, ideas or opinions
orally, in writing or by any other form of expression, and to use for such
purpose any means of communication and diffusion, and no censorship
shall be established."3 5 It further states that, "[c]ensorship restricting the
ability of public officials to report on matters for which they are responsi-
ble is prohibited."36 Article 58 of the Venezuelan Constitution states
[e]veryone has the right to timely, truthful and impartial information,
without censorship, in accordance with the principles of th[e]
[c]onstitution, as well as the right to reply and corrections when they
are directly affected by inaccurate or offensive information. Children
and adolescents have the right to receive adequate information for
purposes of their overall development. 37
Article 108 guarantees the Venezuelan citizenry public access to media
and library and information networks to further "universal access to
29. Ley Organica Telecomunicaciones [Organic Telecommunications Law], art. 192,
available at http://www.efemeridesvenezolanas.com/html/ley.htm.
30. Golinger, supra note 26, at 8-9.
31. Id.
32. Gorrr, supra note 9, at 236.
33. Golinger, supra note 26, at 12-13.
34. Id. at 7.
35. VENEZ. CONs-r. art. 57 (emphasis added).
36. VENEZ. CONsr. art. 57.
37. VENEZ. CONsr. art. 58.
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information." 38
Although the Venezuelan Constitution states that there is a right to
freedom of expression, Article 60 constrains this right by stating, "[t]he
use of electronic information shall be restricted by law in order to guaran-
tee the personal and family intimacy and honor of citizens and the full
exercise of their rights."39 This inconsistency renders the freedom of ex-
pression moot if the government has the power to tell families what is and
what is not good for them.
Beyond the Venezuelan Constitution, many international treaties to
which Venezuela is a party also proclaim the importance of freedom of
expression.40 Article 13 of the American Convention on Human rights
states that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought and expres-
sion. ... includ[ing] freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and
ideas of all kinds . . . ."41 This article further proclaims that this freedom
of information "shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be sub-
ject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly estab-
lished by law. . . ."42 Venezuela, as it shall be shown, has not constructed
prior censorship, but has made the social responsibility in the radio and
television law so vague as to create a method in which the media outlets
subject themselves to prior censorship in order to avoid any fines or lia-
bilities in accordance with Venezuelan law. 4 3 On the other hand, this
same article states, under clause 4, that "public entertainment may be
subject to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to
them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence." 4 4 Support-
ers of RESORTE would point to this as a basis for the legitimacy of the
law.4 5 But the construction of RESORTE and the heavy restriction on
public media is not in compliance with either Venezuelan or international
law and customs.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also has certain ar-
ticles to which opponents of RESORTE could point in order to claim that
censorship of this type is prohibited.46 In its 108th regular session, the
Commission stated, "[f]reedom of expression in all its forms and manifes-
tations is a fundamental and inalienable right of all individuals . . . [that]
38. Golinger, supra note 26, at 7; see also VENEZ. CONsr. art. 58.
39. VENEZ. CONST. art. 60.
40. See generally Golinger, supra note 26, at 5-6; American Convention on Human
Rights, art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, No.17955, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/treaties/b-32.html; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), art. 19, Mar. 23, 1976, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/lawl
ccpr.htm; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Declaration of Princi-
ples on Freedom of Expression, 108th Regular Session, Oct. 19, 2000, available at
http://www.iachr.org/declaration.htm.
41. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, No. 17955.
42. Id.
43. Soto, supra note 10, at 430.
44. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, No. 17955.
45. See generally Soto, supra note 10, at 417-18.
46. Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression,
108th Regular Session, Oct. 19, 2000.
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is an indispensable requirement for the very existence of a democratic
society." 47 When speaking about the ownership of media, it clearly
states, "[m]onopolies ... and control of the communication media must
be subject to anti-trust laws, as they conspire against democracy by limit-
ing the plurality and diversity which ensure the full exercise of people's
right to information." 4 8 "Prior censorship, direct or indirect interference
in or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion or information ...
must be prohibited by law. Restrictions . . . and the imposition of obsta-
cles to the free flow of information violate . . . freedom of expression."49
The regular session even cited to Article 13 of the American Convention
on Human Rights, thereby solidifying its stance on freedom of speech
and the dangerous consequences that can occur in a society if this free-
dom is not exercised.50
Finally, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) is also being violated by Venezuela's law. Article 19 states that
"[e]veryone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference
[and] .. . shall have the right to freedom of expression," 5' similar to the
language employed by the American Convention on Human Rights.52
But with this international work, it is important to note that the ICCPR
does carve out two exceptions for the exercise of freedom of speech: (1)
it can be restricted to protect the "rights and reputations of others"53 and
(2) it can be restricted for the sake of national security. 54 RESORTE
supporters could potentially point to these exceptions to demonstrate
that the Chavez administration is well within its right to restrict the media
in the way that the law does, but in instances where two seemingly con-
tradictory articles exist, a balance must be achieved. RESORTE does no
such thing and, as the following paragraphs will show, annihilates free-
dom of speech to such a degree that it ought to be reformed.
C. RESORTE AND ITS PROVISIONS
In 2004, the Venezuelan National Assembly enacted RESORTE, a law
drafted by the National Telecommunications Committee (CONATEL).55
Under the guise of holding radio and television outlets socially responsi-
ble for the messages they disseminate, 56 RESORTE implemented various
47. Id.; see also Golinger, supra note 26, at 5-6.
48. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Declaration of Principles on Free-
dom of Expression, 108th Regular Session, Oct. 19, 2000.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 19.
52. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, No. 17955.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), CPJ condemns two Venezuelan media
laws, Dec. 21, 2010, http://www.cpj.org/2010/12/cpj-condemns-two-venezuelan-me-
dia-laws.php; Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Attack on the Press 2004:
Venezuela, Mar. 14, 2005, http://cpj.org/2005/03/attacks-on-the-press-2004-
venezuela.php.
56. RESORTE, art. 1.
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restrictions on the types of messages that could be transmitted and the
manner by which they could be transmitted.57 The more controversial
components of RESORTE will be discussed in more detail below.
1. Dividing Airtime and the Classification of Language, Health, Sex,
and Violence
One of the most obvious provisions of RESORTE is its division of air-
time into three slots.5 8 Between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m., programming should
be directed to "all users, including children and adolescents without su-
pervision."5 9 Programming between 5 a.m. and 7 a.m. as well as from 7
p.m. to 11 p.m. should be directed to all users, with supervision from
adults. 6 0 While the adult programming time slot where children "should
not" be the recipients is between 11 pm and 5 am. 6 1 The law also guides
the media in determining what it can and cannot disseminate during these
times by classifying certain topics. 6 2
According to RESORTE, language has three classifications: 1)
"images or sounds of common use that can be seen by children and ado-
lescents without supervision," 6 3 2) "images or sounds that when used
commonly have a gross character," 6 4 and 3) "images and sounds that
when commonly used have an obscene character" 65 that describe, re-
present, or allude, without any explicit educative purpose, to genitalia or
sexual practices.66
Health has four classifications: 1) content that gives information, opin-
ion, or acknowledgement over prevention, treatment or eradication of
the consumption of alcohol, tobacco, narcotics, or psychotropic drugs and
other addictive behaviors that do not require parental supervision, 2) the
same that requires parental supervision, 3) content that promotes or re-
fers to the moderate use of these substances and describes their addictive
behavior, and 4) content that not only promotes this behavior, but dem-
onstrates it to an excessive degree without an explanation as to the addic-
tive behavior that can arise. 6 7
Sex has five classifications: 1) content that gives information, opinion,
or acknowledgement of sexual reproduction, parenthood, promotes
breastfeeding, and art that is considered educative that requires no gui-
dance from an adult, 2) the same that does require supervision, 3) content
without an educative end, but also without any semblance of eroticism
57. See generally Soto, supra note 10, at 429-46.




62. Id. art. 6; see also Soto, supra note 10, at 430-35 (discussing the hour blocks and
demonstrative table that details the classification system).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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and which does not include any explicit sexual acts, 4) dramatized sexual
scenes without full-frontal nudity, without an educative purpose, and 5)
content regarding real sexual acts with full-frontal nudity that may in-
clude violent imagery such as rape or any other denigration.68
Finally, violence is divided into five classifications as well: 1) content
that is used for the prevention or elimination of violence that can be
presented to children and adolescents without supervision, 2) explicit im-
agery of violence, though dramatized, 3) graphic content or descriptions
that require adult supervision when shown to children so long as the con-
tent is not detailed or the consequences of the violence is shown to a
detailed extent, 4) imagery that shows real violence or the consequences
of violent acts that is not explicit or, on the other hand, dramatized vio-
lence and its consequences in an explicit way without details, and 5)
graphic content that demonstrates real or dramatized violence or the con-
sequences of violent actions in an explicit and detailed manner; physical,
psychological, or verbal violence directed towards children, adolescents,
or women; or sexual violence, violence as the central theme, presenting
suicide or self-abuse. 69
Depending on the time block, messages containing certain language,
health, sexual, or violent messages, whether or not for entertainment pur-
poses, may not be shown. 70 Another implication of these hour and con-
tent restrictions is that certain types of news may not be communicated to
the public. For instance, if breaking news occurs regarding any violent
crime or if news of ongoing protests or strikes is to be heard, because the
content may "disturb the public order,"71 the messages cannot be broad-
cast.72 Not only does the content have to adhere to the block times, but
Article 7 further stipulates that during the supervised hours of broadcast-
ing, at most only two hours can be allotted to soap operas and "at least 50
[percent] of this time has to be of Venezuelan production." 73
2. Government Control over Private Media
RESORTE provides a way for the Venezuelan government to use both
public and private media to disseminate its messages, free of charge to
the state and mandatory for the media companies. 74 The government is
not obligated to give any timely warning to the media companies; they
have the obligation of sending the messages out at any time that is chosen
by Chavez, making the media subservient to the state demands of length
and time of publication. 75 In January of 2010, Chavez used this provision




71. Id. art. 28.
72. Id.
73. Id. art. 7.
74. Id. art. 10.
75. Id.
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ration, due to its unwillingness to comply with this law. 7 6 The case went
to the Venezuelan Supreme Court and although the tribunal held that
there was an issue to be resolved through the judicial process, the media
company could not renew its license and had to wait for the outcome in
order to continue regular broadcasting.77
3. Rights of the Citizenry
Article 12 covers the participation and organization of the citizenry
with regards to RESORTE.7 8 According to this article, citizens have the
right to assemble, in any lawful fashion, and to inquire as to the program-
ming of each broadcasting company; further, they have the ability to com-
plain, in advance, for the future airings and if this happens, it then
becomes the responsibility of the broadcasting company to comply. Citi-
zens are also crucial in the "formation, execution, and evaluation" 79 of
the political messages that are disseminated through the airwaves.80 In
short, this allows not only mere citizens to form coalitions, but also gov-
ernmental entities to form organizations as concerned citizens that pro-
mote their viewpoints.
If a citizen wishes to form an organization, he must register with
CONATEL and with the public registry.8' These organizations must be
non-profit, among other requirements that they must meet; CONATEL is
obligated, by RESORTE, to facilitate these organizations in their at-
tempts to register with the nation.8 2 Further, Article 12 creates a pre-
sumption of legitimacy for these organizations. 83 For instance, when a
group of people organize themselves and attempt to register as a "watch-
dog" under RESORTE, if within thirty business days CONATEL does
not give them the green light as a watchdog organization, it is presumed
that they have been given organizational status.84 CONATEL also has
the power to choose the procedures and the guidelines by which the or-
ganization registers. One of the more troubling clauses in this article is
the fact that if a citizen organization chooses to file suit against a broad-
cast corporation, regardless of the outcome, the citizen organization need
not pay court fees, as long as the reasons for filing suit were reasonable.85
This leads to the question as to how the court fees are paid: does the state
pay for the court fees or the corporations? This may also lead to an abuse
76. Justin Shore, A Balancing Act: Trends in Latin American Media Laws, Tiun.
HUMAN Rimurrs BRimi, Feb. 15, 2010, http://hrbrief.org/2010/02/la-17-3/.
77. Radio Caracas Television (RCTV) v. CONATEL, No. 2007-0411 (Apr. 17, 2007),
available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/spa/Mayo/00763-23507-2007-2007-
0411.html.









566 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 17
of the system, whereby citizen organizations can file suit against any me-
dia corporation, for any reasonable belief, such as the welfare of the pub-
lic health or public order (RESORTE specifically states that it was
created to protect the public order), and the judicial system would not
hold them fiscally liable for any of the fees incurred. 86 Although support-
ers of RESORTE may claim that these provisions incentivize the citi-
zenry to be watchdogs, this article allows government-created
organizations to use the system itself to prohibit anti-government views
and to use the law to shut down broadcasting companies and suppress
freedom of expression.
D. PROGRAMMING UNDER RESORTE
Under Article 15, the Television Programming Commission, created by
the government, will be responsible for establishing "the mechanisms and
conditions of assigning the allotted spaces for independent produc-
tions."87 "Democracy, pluralism, freedom of expression, and economic
competition"88 are the goals of this commission and consist of one repre-
sentative from the executive branch (who will preside over the entirety of
the commission), one representative of the television stations, one repre-
sentative of the independent producers of Venezuela, and finally one rep-
resentative of the citizenry.89 Decisions over the space allotted to each
type of program will be made by majority vote of these four people, and
in cases of ties, the presiding representative will have a double vote.90 In
effect, this commission can be one-sided because it is comprised of the
government representative, the representative of the citizen-organization
(who has enumerated powers given to him by the government), the inde-
pendent producer that represents those who are given licenses by the
government, thereby leaving the television broadcasting company repre-
sentative as the only person opposite the scales of decision-making. Fur-
ther, by giving the presiding representative a double vote in case of a tie,
this provision fully defers to the government.
From these provisions, it is quite unclear where the government's
power ends and where the interests of the citizenry are being protected.
RESORTE has the language of a law that seeks democracy and the ad-
vancement of human rights, but it is invariably nationalistic and paternal-
istic. Not only does RESORTE include guidelines that are so vague and
hard to materialize that media outlets are better off practicing their own
prior censorship than to face the penalties associated with breaking the
law, but it also centers on the theme of nationalism. For instance, not
only does television programming have to conform to particular rules re-
garding culture and nationalism, but during the unsupervised and super-
86. Id.




MEDIA LAWS IN LATIN AMERICA
vised hours of radio programming, four hours have to be independent
productions (i.e. not private media corporations) and must also incorpo-
rate the youth either in the program itself or in its production.9' Priority
is given to cultural, educational, or informative programming, both in ra-
dio and in television. 92 When it comes to the music that is being broad-
cast, during the unsupervised and supervised hours, it has been
determined that fifty percent of the programming must be Venezuelan,
while the other fifty percent is international in nature.93 Of the fifty per-
cent of Venezuelan music, half of that time must be used to promote Ven-
ezuelan folk or traditional music. 94
RESORTE's provisions create a nanny-state with regard to the media
and this has now been extended to also include the Internet.95 The gov-
ernment is allowed to determine what is good for families and their chil-
dren as well as the hours that the families will be subjected to the
programming that the government has determined is in the best interest
of the country as a whole. The paternalism could be tolerable if there was
an opportunity for media outlets to express themselves or present griev-
ances through the law, but RESORTE does not grant this ability. Since
the implementation of RESORTE, the number of privately owned media
corporations has drastically dwindled and has in effect rendered media
accessible only to a minority of the population. 96
III. ARGENTINA
Argentina's history is also fraught with dictatorship and authoritarian
regimes. The 2009 Audiovisual Communications Services Law (Audiovi-
sual Law) in Argentina is not so focused on regulating the programming
behavior of the broadcasting companies, nor is it interested in acting on
behalf of the citizenry by explicitly enumerating the type of programming
that is important to the social development and education of its youth.97
The Audiovisual Law does the exact opposite, to a certain extent, of what
the Venezuelan law does: by allowing for more diversified ownership of
the media, President Kirchner is increasing competition and decreasing
the ability of particular groups, such as Grupo Clarin, to control the
whole of the media.98
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. art. 14.
94. Id.
95. Committee to Protect Journalists, supra note 55.
96. Caitlin McNulty and Liz Migliorelli, Media in Venezuela: Facts and Fiction, Aug.
17, 2009, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/venezuela-archives-35/2059-media-in-
venezuela-facts-and-fiction.
97. Compare Audiovisual Communication Services Law, art. 68 with Ley de Respon-
sabilidad Social en Radio, Televisi6n, y Medios Electr6nicos, art. 7.
98. CNN.com/world, Argentina media bill advances, Sept. 18, 2009, http://edition.cnn.
com/2009/WORLD/americas/09/18/argentina.media/index.html; see generally
Shore, supra note 79.
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A. MEDIA LAWS DURING ARGENTINA'S Junta Military Dictatorship
Prior to the military coup d'etat that occurred in 1976, the Peronist gov-
ernment, under the belief that government ought to control the mass me-
dia, cancelled the licenses of various private television channels,
confiscated production companies "in the [name of the] public inter-
est,"99 and levied taxes on advertising that in effect decreased the earn-
ings of the privatized media and increased the government's control. 00
Upon the death of President Per6n in 1974, Argentina entered an era of
lawlessness that the armed forces used in order to stage a military coup
d'etat.o'0 Although the military stated its belief in freedom of the press
and private media ownership to the citizens, it still demanded strict ad-
herence to the notion of Argentine national security.102 This demand
soon converted Argentina into a state of terror: the junta declared indefi-
nite jail terms for any media outlet that released information on guerilla
groups as well as a ten-year jail term for members of the media who
transmitted information in opposition of the armed forces or made men-
tion of the military's flagrant disregard of human rights. 03
In addition to the junta strategy of threatening journalists into submis-
sion with prison terms, "[d]uring its reign, seventy-two journalists disap-
peared and were probably murdered. . .and many fled into exile." 0 4 It
also maintained tight control over the television channels that had previ-
ously been taken over by President Per6n. 05 Although the junta had
promised to return the television channels to private control, it failed to
do so and opted instead to use them to gain "favorable news coverage
and strict censorship control." 0 6 The Broadcasting Law of 1980 was also
passed during the junta regime.107 The law "establishe[d] caps on station
ownership. . .prevent[ed] newspaper-TV cross-ownership, prohibit[ed]
the formation of TV broadcasting networks, ban[ned] foreign invest-
ment . . . and impose[d] numerous content regulations."10 8 Further, li-
censing was the responsibility of the executive in cases of local
broadcasting and in the hands of the Comit6 Federal de Radiodifusi6n
(COMFER) in cases of complementary services, such as cable TV.'09 It
was not until the 1990s, almost seven years after the dictatorship's defeat
in the Malvinas Islands, that reform began to take hold on the media."r0
99. HERian--ro MURARo, Dictatorship and Transition to Democracy: Argentina 1973-
86, in MEDIA AND PoLITinS IN LAnN AMERICA, 116 (Elizabeth Fox ed., 1988).
100. Id.
101. Id.




106. H1ERNAN GA[.PIRfN, Transforming Television in Argentina: Market Development
and Policy Reform in the 1990s, in LAtIN Potmrt-cs, GILO1AL MEI'A, 22, 27 (Eliza-
beth Fox & Silvio Waisbord eds., 2002).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 28.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 22; MURARo, supra note 99, at 120.
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The law reforms took time partly because of the media owners' desires to
be protected by the government and not have to compete in the interna-
tional market, while simultaneously demanding that there be less govern-
ment interference in their broadcasting and commercial affairs. 1 '
B. THE WAVE OF REFORMS
Beginning in the late 1980s, Argentina began to see a new era where
government began loosening its control over media outlets and Argentina
itself went through the process of internationalization.112 With respect to
deregulation, the Law of State Reform 23.696/89 had the most impact
when it was passed in 1989.113 This law required that all state-controlled
commercial TV stations become privatized and further eliminated owner-
ship restrictions, such as that on cross-ownership of newspaper and televi-
sion. 114 In 1991, Presidential Decree 1771/91 lifted the ban on the
creation of national networks as well as eliminated the cap on advertise-
ment time per hour and the restriction on product placement during regu-
lar programming." 5 Advertising regulations loosened again in 1993
when Resolution 1226/93 lifted the restrictions on foreign-produced
ads.'1 6 In 1994, the ban on foreign investments was lifted through an
investment treaty with the United States." 7 Because of the increase in
foreign investments after the ban on ownership was lifted," 8 the relief of
the financial burden on Argentina allowed for more educational and cul-
tural programming, something that the Argentine government could not
afford when it financed the state-owned media." 9
C. THE AUDIOVISUAL LAW OF 2009
Contrary to RESORTE, which is preoccupied with imposing social re-
sponsibility upon media outlets in order to protect the youth of the
county,120 the Audiovisual Law states that it hopes to promote ethical
behavior between media groups, either through the ideals of interna-
tional journalism groups, journalistic code of conduct, or through the eth-
ics outlined in the Argentine Constitution.121 More importantly, this law
explicitly states that its purpose is not to control the programming of the
media broadcasting company nor to limit or sanction freedom of expres-
sion, but to promote these ideals unlike its predecessor law, the Broad-
111. MURARO, supra note 99, at 122.
112. GALPERtN, supra note 105, at 30.
113. Id. at 29.
114. David J. Park, Media, Democracy, and Human Rights in Argentina, 26 J. COMMC'N
INOUIRY 237, 244 (2002).
115. Galperin, supra note 106, at 29.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 31.
118. Id. at 30.
119. Muraro, supra note 99, at 123; Galperin, supra note 106, at 32.
120. RESORTE, supra note 8, art. 1.
121. Audiovisual Law, supra note 8, art. 3.
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casting Law of 1980.122 Audiovisual communications are a crucial social
activity that the state has an interest in protecting to the highest degree
because it includes the freedom of expression.123 Unlike the Venezuelan
law, the Argentine law does not have as one of its objectives the protec-
tion of the youth of the nation.124 This eliminates any need that
lawmakers may have to regulate the type of programming or the times
for certain programming as well as eliminates any paternalism that may
seep into the congressional law-making powers of the nation. This is evi-
denced by the fact that the prior reforms of 1990 made it a priority to ban
a significant amount of the regulatory language from the Broadcasting
Law of 1980.125
Article 3 demonstrates the Argentine conviction to freedom of speech
by stating that by virtue of its objectives, it should be the services of au-
diovisual communication themselves that choose what to transmit and
what not to transmit in accordance with the Argentine Constitution, the
American Convention on Human Rights, the respect of others' personal
rights, and the democratic ideals. 126 This is one of the major distinctions
between the Venezuelan and Argentine law: while Venezuela attempts to
label every single type of content that is available on the television, radio,
and internet services in order to put them into specific categories and
then to subsequently restrict the hours that they can be transmitted, 127
Argentina leaves this determination up to the providers themselves and
hopes that by increasing the number of media providers, more ideas will
be presented to the masses through which debate can be conducted and
ideas interchanged.128
1. Argentina's Stance on Monopolies
The Audiovisual Law holds economic opportunities and the diversifica-
tion of investments as priorities.129 The law encourages the prevention of
anti-competition and monopoliesl 30 while the overall big picture is to
make sure that a majority of the media is not dominated by only a few
companies, as it has been in past years.131 In order to receive a license as
a broadcasting company, specific criteria need to be met.13 2 The evalua-
tion of a license application must look to: (1) always amplify or at least
122. Id.; Galperin, supra note 106, at 27-28.
123. Audiovisual Law, supra note 8, art. 2.
124. Id. art. 3.
125. See generally Galperin, supra note 106, at 28-30.
126. Audiovisual Law, supra note 8, art. 3.
127. RESORTE, supra note 8, arts. 7-9.
128. Park, supra note 114, at 245; see generally Argentina Media Bill Passes, supra note
98.
129. See generally Argentina Media Bill Passes, supra note 98.
130. Rachel Hall, Clarin Versus Cristina: The Battle for the Airwaves, TiE ARGLENTINA
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 14, 2009, http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/
newsfromargentina/clarin-versus-cristina-the-battle-for-the-airwaves-/.
131. Id.; Posting of D.P. to The Economist: Americas View http://www.economist.com/
blogs/americasview/2010/10/argentinas-media (Oct. 8, 2010, 14:33PM).
132. Audiovisual Law, supra note 8, art. 34.
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maintain pluralism in the awarding of licenses, (2) guarantee freedom of
expression and the free exchange of ideas and opinions within the specific
audiovisual service, (3) the interests of the users and society in general,
(4) accommodate all service providers, (5) contribute to the development
of that specific industry, and (6) contribute to the development of social
issues.133 The note to the article states that these criteria came about
specifically after the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights rec-
ommended to both Guatemala and Paraguay the need to apply "demo-
cratic criteria in the distribution of radio and television licenses" and
implement mechanisms that guarantee people equal opportunity to ac-
cess television and radio licenses.134 This sentiment was echoed for the
rest of the region. 35 One of the more controversial provisions of the
Audiovisual Law states that all media in the country shall be divided into
three groups: (1) media outlets that are privately owned, (2) media out-
lets owned by the state, and (3) media outlets that are owned by citizen
organizations or civil groups (independent groups).136 By mandating that
all media outlets will be divided in this fashion, President Kirchner is at-
tempting to break up the small monopolies and spread access to media
ownership to all groups in an attempt for a more democratic
Argentina.' 37
2. The Feud between Grupo Clarin and President Kirchner
Though it seems that the Audiovisual Law is more agreeable to the
ideals of democracy, one of the main critics of the law has been Grupo
Clarfn, which at the point of the passage of the law was one of the biggest
media companies in Argentina.' 38 Grupo Clarin and President Kirchner
have often butted heads during the president's term.' 39 The feud began
in 2008 when Kirchner accused Grupo Clarin of biased and unfair cover-
age related to a tax scheme that she imposed on the farming popula-
tion.140 In fact, the media juggernaut rose up in defense of the farming
sector and thereby began the feud between it and the President that




136. Hall, supra note 130.
137. See generally Id.
138. Id.; Carlos Laurid, Argentine Government Feud with Clarin Deepens, COMmiurfEE
To PRonsC.r JOURNAu-isis, Aug. 27, 2010, http://cpj.org/blog/2010/08/argentine-
government-feud-with-clarin-deepens.php.
139. See generally, Laurig, supra note 138; Argentina's President Moves to Seize Control
of Country's Newsprint, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 25, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/2010/aug/25/argentina-president-newsprint.
140. Laurid, supra note 138; Politics, Tinm ARGENTINA INDEPENDENT, June 13, 2010,
http://www.argentinaindependent.com/insideargentina/politics-insideargentina/
politics-/.
141. See generally Juzgado Federal [Juzg. Fed.] [Federal Court], 27/8/2010, "Asociaci6n
civil de consumidores c. Fibertel/amparo," Exp. No. 50.000, available at http://
www.clarin.com/politicalFallo-completoCLAFIL20100827_0003.pdf.
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Fibertel, Grupo Clarin's internet service provider, to shut down, claiming
that Grupo Clarin was building an illegal monopoly.142 The judge in this
instance realized that Fibertel fed internet wires to over 1 million people
in the country and refused to apply the Audiovisual Law, not necessarily
because it was unconstitutional, as was argued by Fibertel, but because it
would cause the citizens to lose access to information.14 3
Because the feud between Grupo Clarin and President Kirchner exists,
many criticisms that arose from the implementation of the Audiovisual
Law allude to the idea that President Kirchner signed the bill into law in
an attempt to punish Grupo Clarin for its own criticisms of the Kirchner
administration. 1 4 4 This is not the only instance in which Grupo Clarin has
been attacked by the administration.14 5 In September of 2009, soon after
Grupo Clarfn's newspaper, Clarin,14 6 ran a story stating that the govern-
ment had illegally granted a farm subsidy, the Argentine tax authorities
were sent to the newspaper's offices in Buenos Aires in order to "ex-
amin[e] the company's books" 14 7 and to conduct an inspection similar to
that of other companies, though Grupo Clarin took it as a targeted raid
and tensions between the two parties have since escalated.14 8
In August of 2009, President Kirchner and her administration accused
the two leading newspapers in the country, Clarin and La Nacion, of
"conspiring with the former military regime to commit crimes against hu-
manity" 1 4 9 by gaining control of Papel Prensa, a newspaper that had ties
with the international distribution market,o50 and then "leveraging . . .
[the] ownership to drive other publications out of business."s15  This alle-
gation, in addition to adding fuel to the feud, also drove a wedge within
the press in the country.152 Since the allegations, President Kirchner has
also presented an official investigation entitled "Papel Prensa: The Truth"
142. Mac Margolis, The Read and the Black: Why are Latin American democracies sud-
denly attacking the free press?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 31, 2010, available at http://www.
newsweek.com/201 0/08/31 /latin-american-democracies-lash-out-at-the-press.print.
html.
143. Juzgado Federal [Juzg. Fed.] [Federal Court], 27/8/2010, "Asociaci6n civil de con-
sumidores c. Fibertel /amparo," Exp. No. 50.000, available at http://www.clarin.
com/politica/Fallo-completo_-CLAFIL20100827_0003.pdf; Bill Faries, Argentina
Judge Freezes Order to Close Clarin's Fibertel Unit, Perfil Says, BiLooMiERG, Sept.
26, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-26/argentina-judge-freezes-or-
der-to-close-clarin-s-fibertel-unit-perfil-says.html.
144. Mariano Castillo, Critics Say Argentine Media Bill Targets Single Conglomerate,
CNN WORLo, Sept. 17, 2009, http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-17/world/argentina.
media_1_grupo-clarin-eurasia-group-nestor-kirchner?s=PM:WORLD.
145. See generally LauriAi, supra note 138.
146. Tax Authorities Raid Argentina's Biggest Newspaper, REu-ri~s, Sept. 10, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/10/argentina-media-clarin-idUSN10404230
20090910.
147. Id.; Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the Press 2010: Argentina, Feb.
15, 2011, 1, http://www.cpj.org/2011/02/attacks-on-the-press-2010-argentina.php.
148. Id.
149. Committee to Protect Journalists, supra note 147.
150. Muraro, supra note 99, at 119.
151. Committee to Protect Journalists, supra note 147.
152. Id.
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and has accused the former owners of having made the deal under du-
ress. 153 Soon after President Kirchner revealed this information, she
called on the judiciary to evaluate the responsibility of the two conglom-
erates for their crimes against humanity, and in October, the administra-
tion even introduced legislation that would deem newspapers a "matter
of public interest" 154 in order to regulate them as well.s5 5 Although this
overview of the Audiovisual Law seems to be much more democratic
than that of the Venezuelan law, there are pending dangers, especially
when one considers the feud between the government and the mass me-
dia. 156 It can be noted that the Audiovisual Law of Argentina does not
conflate with the international instruments of law previously discussed.
With regards to the American Convention on Human Rights and the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Audiovisual Law's
objective of promoting freedom of speech157 and eliminating monopo-
lies158 complies completely.159 It also does not violate ICCPR, as ICCPR
would allow for certain regulation, as discussed above.160
IV. THE HUTCHINS COMMISSION
In the 1940s, the United States itself debated the role of media in its
democracy. 61 Because of the growing technologies of the time and the
small number of entities that could provide media outlets to the peo-
ple,16 2 the Hutchins Commission was brought together to explore the me-
dia's role in a democratic society and to see whether mass media could
indeed be self-regulated in order to not advance totalitarianism. 16 3
When an instrument of prime importance to all the people is availa-
ble to a small minority of the people only, and when it is employed
by that small minority in such a way as not to supply the people with
the service they require, the freedom of the minority in the employ-
ment of that instrument is in danger.164
In studying the role of media in a free society, the Hutchins Commis-
sion found that if a medium was unaccountable, then government could
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id.
156. See generally Castillo, supra note 144.
157. Audiovisual Law, supra note 8, art. 1.
158. Id. art. 34 (note to art. 34).
159. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
23, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights, Declaration of Principles on freedom of Expression, 108th
Regular Session, Oct. 19, 2000.
160. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 29, Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
161. Victor Pickard, Whether the Giants Should be Slain or Persuaded to Be Good, 27
CRITICAL S-ruDIEs IN MEaoA CoMM'c 391, 396 (2010).
162. Romjir M. HUTCHINS, A FiuE AN) RestroNSI3LEt_ PREss, I (U. of Chicago Press
1947).
163. Pickard, supra note 161, at 396.
164. HurcinNS, supra note 162, at 1-2.
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intervene and set regulations for it.16 5 But because of the international
climate at the time, the majority of the commissioners chose to instead
frame the issue as that of social responsibility that media outlets must
undertake. 16 6 The crucial finding of the Hutchins Commission was that in
order to be effective in a free society, media outlets ought to be self-
regulatedl67 and take one or more of the following roles: (1) provide a
"truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a
context which gives them meaning,"168 (2) provide a venue for the ex-
change of ideas, (3) project a representative picture of the citizenry in the
country, (4) clarify the values of the society, and (5) provide "full access
to the day's intelligence." 16 9 Although these roles seem self-evident to
those who hold the First Amendment so highly, the report received much
unwelcomed criticism because it imposed a certain amount of accounta-
bility on the U.S. press that had not previously been established.170 But
the Hutchins Commission did provide the blueprint for a responsible me-
dia in a democratic society that balances First Amendment press rights
with the rights of the public interest.171 The following paragraphs will
explain the roles previously mentioned and apply them to the Venezuelan
and Argentine laws respectively.
A. TRUTHFUL AND COMPREHENSIVE AccoUNT
Because of the power that the media has in society, it is important that
reporters and journalists alike not lie when it comes to presenting the
news.172 This should not be confused with the fact that the journalists
may divulge information that not everyone is content with being public.
Using Venezuela as an example, it is clear that the media coup d'etat of
2002 depicted inaccurate information.173 In fact, the media's actions in
2002 would be egregious enough for prosecution had the coverage oc-
curred within the jurisdiction of the United States.174 But the way that
the Venezuelan law reads now absolutely prohibits any anti-government
viewpoints and creates a scheme in which everyday news must conform to
a specific time frame, no matter how urgent the information.' 75 There-
fore, any dissent that is covered on the news cannot be shown. If there is
violence in the news (i.e. news coverage of acts of violence that have been
perpetrated upon the citizens of the state), the details on the events can-
165. Pickard, supra note 161, at 396.
166. Id. at 400.
167. Id. at 404.
168. HurrciINS, supra note 162, at 20-21.
169. Id. at 20-21, 28.
170. Pickard, supra note 161, at 405.
171. See id.
172. HUTCHINS, supra note 162, at 21.
173. See generally Golinger, supra note 26, at 8-11.
174. Steve Forbes, Could a Chavez-Style Media Crackdown be Coming Our Way? Fox
News, Mar. 24 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/03/24/steve-forbes-
venezuela-hugo-chavez-media-robert-mcchesney-free-press/.
175. RESORTE, supra note 8, art. 1.
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not be discussed in full. 1 7 6 Further, if the news may cause chaos, media
outlets are explicitly forbidden from detailing the information.17 7 Pro-
tests or strikes that occur on the streets of Venezuela would not be re-
ported because the messages may cause public disorder.17 8  The
Argentine law, because it attempts to diversify the number of media out-
lets available to the public,179 does not hinder the responsibility imposed
on the press in being truthful and giving an account on the events of the
day. It is important to note that the Audiovisual Law does have some
similarities to the Venezuelan law in that Article 68 also illustrates the
government's desire to protect the youth of its country by imposing cer-
tain restrictions on what can and cannot be transmitted depending on the
hour of the day.180 In fact, the notes to Article 68 explicitly look to Vene-
zuelan law.181
B. VENUE FOR THE EXCHANGE OF COMMENT AND CRITICISM
According to the Hutchins Commission study, the press, as a carrier of
public discussion, should assume the responsibility as such and should
make it a point to print or disseminate messages that are contrary to its
own.182 This is where the idea of objectivity arises, as it is only objectivity
that will allow unpopular views to be heard across the country.183 By
having a free press, the media is better able to print ideas belonging to
the citizens who do not have sufficient resources to publish their thoughts
or do not have the requisite access to news stations that others may
have.18 4 Venezuela's law does not allow for any citizen to form and dis-
seminate their messages towards the masses.' 85 The only right that a citi-
zen has under RESORTE is that he has the right to complain about the
current and future programming on television and radio as well as the
messages on the Internet.186 RESORTE explicitly states what messages
can and what messages cannot be disseminated through the media.187
Prior to RESORTE, there was a broader freedom of expression because
more media outlets were available, as evidenced by the fact that the me-
dia could be so blatantly anti-government prior to RESORTE. 88 The
implementation of RESORTE in Venezuelan society has reduced the
number of privately owned media corporations, thereby making it even
harder for the common citizen to publicize his views, opinions, or com-
176. Id. art. 7-9.
177. Id. art. 2.
178. Id. art 28.
179. Audiovisual Law, supra note 8, art. 21.
180. Id. art. 68.
181. Id.
182. HurciNS, supra note 162, at 23-24.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 25.
185. RESTORE, supra note 8, at art. 8.
186. Id. at art. 7.
187. Id.
188. Gollinger, supra note 26, at 6-7.
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mentary.i8 9 Not only has the number of privately owned media corpora-
tions dwindled, but the restrictions in RESORTE have made it
impossible for even corporations to express their ideas freely, much less a
common citizen.190 The Audiovisual Law brings about a completely dif-
ferent result. Although Grupo Clarin has criticized President Kirchner's
administration, the government is not attempting to stifle the media out-
lets by imposing regulations or guidelines as to the messages that can be
transmitted. By putting a stop to a seeming monopoly, Argentina is at-
tempting to bring about the forum that a free society should foster.191
C. PROJECTING A REPRESENTATIVE PICTURE OF THE CITIZENRY
Though similar to the preceding requirements, this requirement dem-
onstrates the importance of a varied amount of ideas so that each constit-
uency has access to information that is relevant to it.192 "People make
decisions in large part in terms of favorable or unfavorable images." 93
For this very same reason, the media coup d'etat in Venezuela was unethi-
cal and untruthful: the media in this instance was backed by opponents to
the Chavez regime and because they had the stranglehold on the media,
they were able to mobilize protests against him.194 Had the country had
fair coverage of both supporters and opponents, the coup d'etat could
have ended with little to no casualties, but deaths did occur because the
public was so mobilized and angered by the images with which it was
presented.195 Certain aspects of the Venezuelan law do adhere to this
requirement, such as the requirement for certain types of programming to
be incorporated into a regular broadcast. 196 But the rigidity of the rules
and the stiff penalties associated with them have led to the media outlets
themselves practicing prior censorship.
D. PRESENTING THE GOALS AND VALUES OF SOCIETY
The Hutchins Commission, in presenting the goals and values of soci-
ety, sides very closely with the Venezuelan law. In fact, this is perhaps the
only requirement to which RESORTE adheres. Article 1 states that the
law was created in order to instill social responsibility on all forms of
communication.197 Article 3 further states that the objective of the law is
to "guarantee that all families and persons in general can count with the
judicial mechanisms that permits for the adequate role of media and its
responsibility"1 98 to society as well as the responsibility of the citizens to
189. Id. at 7.
190. See RESORTE, supra note 8, art. 7.
191. See Audiovisual Law, supra note 8, art. 3.
192. HuTCHINs, supra note 162, at 26.
193. Id.
194. Golinger, supra note 26, at 8.
195. Id.
196. RESORTE, supra note 8, art. 3.
197. Id., art. 1.
198. Id. art. 3.
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hold the media accountable for what they display.199 Clause 4 of Article
3 states that one of the main focuses of the law is to promote the welfare
of the youth of Venezuela in that the information presented to them be of
social interest that enhances their development, personality, mentality,
and physicality. 200 Clauses 5 and 7 discuss the promotion of national
products and Venezuelan culture, and the regulations are all aimed at
protecting the youth and the citizenry alike, as well as promoting nation-
alism. 201 Similarly, the Argentine law focuses on the importance of fos-
tering common societal goals in its citizens.202
E. FULL ACCESS TO THE DAY'S INTELLIGENCE
Because there is a plethora of information available due to the ad-
vances made in technology, it is impossible to imagine a person capable
of taking in all the information each day and using it. This is where the
Internet becomes such a valuable tool. With information only a fingertip
away, the requirement for freedom of ideas via the Internet is more cru-
cial than ever and will continue to be even more important in the fu-
ture.203 RESORTE, as it now applies to the Internet, is one of the most
troubling signs of the impediment to freedom of expression in Latin
America.204 In this respect, Argentina's judicial system understands the
implications to liberty if the Internet is taken away from its citizens.205
By not going through with President Kirchner's order to freeze Fibertel,
Argentina is truly championing freedom of expression to such an extent
that the international community has taken notice and commended
them.206
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the passage of RESORTE in 2004, Chavez has eliminated all but
one private media company, Globovisi6n.207 On the other hand, Argen-
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ing it will keep the Internet from the Argentine citizenry.208 There has
been no shortage of criticism of these two laws, and the ways in which the
international community has attempted to reach out to the governments
are overwhelming. 209 After analyzing both the Argentine and Venezue-
lan laws, it is evident that the more dangerous law to democracy and to
freedom of speech is RESORTE, and that the Audiovisual Law, though
having a hint of vengeance due to the feud between the media and the
current administration, is the better proponent of freedom of speech and
to the free exchange of ideas.
Forcing a country to adhere to principles that are found to be of great
value in a different country is imprudent and ineffective, as every coun-
try's government is the sovereign in its respective territory. But the
Hutchison Commission does shed some light on the ways media can be
used in a democratic society, especially with the new technologies that
have become available since the 1940s and those that are on the hori-
zon.210 This is especially important in Latin American countries that
have undergone long periods of totalitarian regimes, such as
Argentina.211
A. ARGENTINA's AUDIOVISUAL LAw
According to the Hutchins Commission, Argentina's Audiovisual Law
completes the functions of a working media for a free society.212 Monroe
Price also states that there are four aspects where media law operates:
"(1) newsgathering, (2) content-based regulation, (3) content-neutral reg-
ulation that has the potential to influence content indirectly; and (4) pro-
tection of journalists in their professional activity, including protection
against physical attacks." 213 According to these factors, the Audiovisual
Law has the ability to reform the media laws of the country because the
decentralization of power allows for newsgathering (from different
sources and viewpoints). The law also explicitly states that the media will
be divided between the state, the private sector, and the non-profit or
civil group sector.214
The feud between the current administration and the media is of public
interest. But, as it stands now, there is nothing indicative that the Audio-
visual Law will bring anything but perhaps fiscal harm to the media con-
208. See Juzgado Federal [Juzg. Fed.] [Federal Court], 27/8/2010, "Asociaci6n civil de
consumidores c. Fibertel /amparo," Exp. No. 50.000, available at http://www.clarin.
com/politica/Fallo-completoCLAFIL20100827-0003.pdf.
209. Jose Cretas, El Gobierno le quito la licencia a Cablevision para dar Internet, LA
NACION, Aug. 20, 2010, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.aspnota-id=1296333;
Dubraska Falcon, Nueva ley silenciara la informacion radial, EL UNIVERSAL, Dec.
15, 2010, http://www.eluniversal.com/2010/12/15/til-artnueva-ley-silenciar_2137
515.shtml; Lauria, supra note 138.
210. Pickard, supra note 161, at 405.
211. See generally Park, supra note 114, at 237.
212. See generally HUTCHINS, supra note 162, at 21-28.
213. Price, supra note 1, at 99.
214. Audiovisual Law, supra note 8, art. 21.
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glomerates, specifically Grupo Clarin, 2 15 or that the Audiovisual Law will
be an impediment to freedom of speech to media as a whole. In fact,
President Kirchner has implemented other changes that lead one to be-
lieve that she and her administration are truly concerned with freedom of
speech and the advancement of democratic ideals within their borders. 216
Besides the Audiovisual Law, President Kirchner also encouraged the
decriminalization of defamation, a huge feat for a Latin American coun-
try.2 17 Within the past years, the Argentinean courts have also ruled that
civil liability for defamation and for violations of one's image cannot be
imposed on internet service providers. 218 As it stands, Argentina is ex-
panding freedom of speech rights to media outlets, and is even garnering
the support of journalists and citizens alike. 2 19
B. VENEZUELA'S RESORTE
The Venezuelan law, taking into consideration the same factors of the
Hutchins Commission, does not allow for a free society and in fact hin-
ders democracy. 220 Not only does it conflate with natural law, but it also
contradicts the Venezuelan Constitution and though it may be argued
that it is in accordance with certain international law, upon a closer in-
spection, it can be seen that even the international treaties allow for a
broader freedom of expression.2 2 1 With the inclusion of the Internet into
RESORTE, it will be much tougher for information to find its way into
the country. In discussing exactly why RESORTE is such a danger to a
free society, it is important to realize that the media has slowly been los-
ing its freedom since Chavez came to power, beginning when the original
RESORTE law was implemented in 2004 after the attempted coup, and
again, now.
C. METHODS OF FREEING VENEZUELAN RESTRICTIONS
ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Because of Chavez's rise to power and his history with the media, there
is no doubt that attempting to bring about freedom of expression in Ven-
215. See generally Hall, supra note 130.
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ezuela will be an arduous and lengthy process. RESORTE has been
amended to cover the Internet as a source of information, making au-
thors who post on the Internet and the internet service providers them-
selves liable for non-compliance.222 In fact, the Internet with its ability to
disseminate information is probably the most important tool that can be
used to change Venezuelan law. The problem is that there is no way that
the Internet will become available to the citizenry once it conforms to the
guidelines and regulations of RESORTE. 223 The intentions of the Vene-
zuelan government must also be questioned when it comes to the imple-
mentation of the Internet under RESORTE. According to inter-office
memos, one of the provisions that was to be included, but was subse-
quently removed, was the ability to take immediate action against any
internet service providers if "illegal" content was found on a website. 224
Thus, proponents of this provision wanted a mechanism to bypass judicial
review, thereby implicating due process rights.
The Venezuelan law has been challenged in the Supreme Court in the
past, and although the justices have determined that their court is the
proper venue for these lawsuits to be heard, no decisions have been made
as to the constitutionality of RESORTE. 225 Author Angel Luis Olivera
Soto brings up an interesting point: because the Venezuelan courts have
yet to determine the constitutionality of this law due to their deference to
the National Assembly,226 perhaps the best venue to bring suit would be
in international court.227 If a press member, such as a member of the
Committee to Protect Journalists, were to bring suit for a violation of
freedom of expression to the international court, not only would this
bring more awareness to the problems arising in Venezuela and other
partly-free countries similar to it, but it would also allow a non-biased
tribunal to look over the law as it stands and determine whether or not it
violates essential human rights.228
As it stands now, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and the Organization of American States' Special Rapporteur for Free-
dom of Expression have expressed their concern about the possible dan-
gers associated with RESORTE. 229 Human Rights Watch and the
Committee to Protect Journalists have also been expressing their opposi-
tion to and worry over RESORTE. 230 It seems that the only way to per-
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suade the Venezuelan government is to have pressure come from within
the country itself or from external non-governmental organizations be-
cause the foreign policy risks associated with a foreign nation stepping in
on behalf of the Venezuelan citizenry are too high. In addition to placing
pressure on Chavez and his administration, such as Human Rights Watch
and Committee for the Protection of Journalists have attempted, one
would be remiss if he did not mention the effect of creating organizations
with the purpose of traveling to Venezuela in order to teach locals about
the free press that is available to foreign individuals in other countries.
The United Nations could also get involved and pressure Chavez to
repeal at least the more restrictive provisions of RESORTE, but it does
not seem that the United Nations would get involved until it had a rea-
son; the possibility of future dangers would negate any justification for
alienating such a powerful figure as Hugo Chavez. The most effective
method of having this law repealed would be within the country, but as
the international community has seen in previous years, revolution is a
last-ditch effort and would not be advisable in this circumstance. For the
time being, the most prudent action to take is to help fund organizations
like the Human Rights Watch and the Committee to Protect Journalists
as they are urging and pressuring the Venezuelan government to repeal
RESORTE. The United States could also stand behind the decisions and
the criticism made by the international commissions on RESORTE in or-
der to show a solidified front for freedom of speech in the free world.
Author Angel Luis Olivera Soto comes to the conclusion that some of
the restrictions laid out in RESORTE are justified because they are for
the "protection of children and adolescents, national security concerns,
public health, multiculturalism, and moral values," 231 though the law it-
self ought to be reworked for certain excessive provisions, such as the
prohibition of anonymous advertisements or propaganda. 232 Although
he offers an alternative to RESORTE, he still finds that a majority of the
provisions are justified because of Venezuela's history and the current
political climate.233 But even these goals are unjustified to implement
RESORTE, especially with the addition of the Internet as an outlet that
would be strongly restricted. Venezuela, if it ever decides to repeal the
law, should look to the same balancing tests that countries like Argentina
and the United States conduct. It appears that Venezuela is more con-
cerned with the ownership and control of media than it is with the welfare
of its public because fostering a paternalistic regulatory scheme is com-
pletely antithetical to democratic ideals. Because the media is set up to
broadcast governmental viewpoints more than dissenting viewpoints, the
Venezuelan government has no incentive to repeal or limit the extent of
RESORTE, leaving the only solution in the hands of the Venezuelan
people.
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